Russian Star Blizzard Group Targets Cloud Identities in Global Espionage Campaign
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The Russian cyber-espionage actor known as Star Blizzard has significantly shifted its tactics to focus on compromising cloud environments and identity providers to facilitate mass data theft, according to new research. The group is increasingly moving beyond simple credential theft to exploit the interconnected nature of modern cloud ecosystems.
Analysis of recent intrusions conducted in late 2025 and 2026 by researchers at Google indicates that the actor—also tracked as Coldriver, Cold Relic, and Callisto—is targeting organisations across North America and Europe. The campaigns demonstrate a sophisticated convergence of human-centric social engineering and the abuse of cloud identities.
Exploiting MFA Fatigue and Residential Proxies
One primary method identified in recent attacks involves the use of residential proxy networks. By routing traffic through IP addresses geographically close to the victim, Star Blizzard attempts to bypass security systems that flag logins from suspicious or distant locations.
In one documented case involving a US-based organisation, the group compromised a super administrator account. To bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), the attackers employed a “push notification fatigue” attack, bombarding the user with requests until one was accidentally or intentionally approved. Once inside, the group used administrative privileges to download the contents of the organisation’s entire cloud storage drive.
The attackers also leveraged automated tools such as Google Workspace Customer Takeout to initiate domain-wide data exports. To hinder forensic investigations, Star Blizzard took specific steps to delete Alert Center notifications and other logs of their activity, maintaining access to the environment for several months to monitor credentials and personnel information.
Pivot to Federated Identity and Secure Messaging
The espionage group has also demonstrated an ability to navigate between different cloud providers. In a separate intrusion, the actor impersonated an employee from a previously compromised organisation to build trust with a new target over a secure messaging application.
During the conversation, the attackers shared phishing links designed to steal credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). Because the victim used Entra ID as a federated single sign-on (SSO) provider for Google Workspace, the compromise allowed the attackers to bridge between Microsoft and Google ecosystems.
Upon gaining access, the group registered their own MFA device within the SSO solution, ensuring persistent access to the account. This allowed for the continuous bulk download of sensitive documents and the harvesting of organizational rosters to support future spearphishing pretexts.
Hardening Cloud Environments Against Identity Abuse
The research highlights that Star Blizzard prioritises the collection of strategic personnel lists, resumes, and internal schedules. These documents are used to create authentic-looking lures for subsequent operations, turning legitimate business communications into attack vectors.
To mitigate these evolving threats, security teams are encouraged to implement several defensive layers:
- Phishing-Resistant MFA: Enforcing the use of hardware security keys can prevent credential interception and fatigue-based attacks.
- Residential Proxy Detection: Enriching authentication logs with IP reputation feeds to identify and block suspicious logins from known proxy networks.
- Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP): Implementing policies to monitor or block the external sharing of sensitive files, particularly those containing credentials or secrets stored in cloud drives.
- Audit and Revocation: Regularly auditing passkey registrations and ensuring all user sessions are revoked immediately following a suspected compromise.
The ability of Russian intelligence services to navigate across multiple cloud platforms underscores the need for organisations to defend their entire identity estate holistically rather than securing individual applications in isolation.



